Brazil Under Systemic Convergence:
External Pressure and Institutional Fragility

Sectors of the opposition are intensifying contacts with the Trump administration. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ) is arranging a trip to the United States, with an agenda scheduled for the coming week, including a possible meeting with President Donald Trump.

The possibility of designating the PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations by the U.S. has lost momentum following the Lula-Trump bilateral meeting and Brazil's presentation of a plan to combat organized crime. The issue, however, remains sensitive within the bilateral relationship.

Bolivia is facing a severe political and social crisis, with a general strike called by the Central Operária Boliviana (COB), road blockades, and demands for the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz.

This crisis fits into a broader regional context of increased U.S. activism:

• The U.S. launched the Shield of the Americas coalition in March 2026, with Bolivia's participation
• Paraguay signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Washington
• Bolivia severed diplomatic relations with Colombia
• Venezuela is undergoing a post-Maduro transition; Cuba faces intense economic pressure and expanded sanctions
• Ecuador maintains reinforced security cooperation with the U.S.

Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia — the three largest countries in the region with left-wing governments — were excluded from the Shield of the Americas coalition. A growing U.S. alignment with right-wing governments in the region is observable.

The plea deal of former banker Daniel Vorcaro is advancing under the supervision of Supreme Court Justice André Mendonça, maintaining elevated risk of implications for authorities across the Three Branches. Fiscal and institutional fragilities persist.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is expected to persist, with full normalization projected only for the first half of 2027, generating continuous upward pressure on fuel prices and inflation in Brazil.