The diplomatic crisis between Brasília and Washington, worsening with every new event, is not a mere bump in the road. It is not just a commercial dispute, a protocol issue, or a communication breakdown between foreign ministries.
It is the external symptom of a much older Brazilian crisis: the inability of our ruling elite to understand the transformations in the national and international landscape and to formulate a national project above their immediate interests.
The tariffs imposed by the United States, Brazil's request for consultations at the World Trade Organization, the extension of the U.S. national emergency regarding Brazil, and the revocation of the Brazilian ambassador's visa in Washington indicate that the bilateral relationship is undergoing a dramatic shift in nature. Events are unfolding far faster than Brazil's capacity to interpret them and respond in a coordinated manner according to the Nation's true interests.
Public discussion, however, remains subordinate to domestic polarization. Government and opposition evaluate each episode based on its electoral utility. One side frames the confrontation as proof of sovereignty. The other treats foreign pressure as a legitimate tool against its internal adversaries. Neither answers the fundamental question: what are Brazil's true National Objectives?
Contemporary Brazil bears a disturbing structural resemblance to the country of the 1950s and 1960s. Not because history is repeating itself, but because we are once again combining political radicalization, social fragmentation, international pressure, and the absence of a ruling elite capable of providing strategic planning and direction to the Brazilian State.
During that period, civil elites failed to manage the conflicts of a rapidly transforming society. They were incapable of producing minimum consensus, preserving democratic competition, and organizing a national project that could survive partisan disputes.
The civil-military intervention of 1964 did not have a single cause. It resulted from the Cold War, ideological radicalization, international pressures, social conflicts, economic interests, and the fear of political and military fragmentation during an extremely dangerous global context. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis had brought the planet to the brink of nuclear war, right over our heads. But the pusillanimity of civil elites in the face of unfolding crises was one of the conditions that pushed the country toward institutional collapse.
The concentration of power established after 1964—the Systole—imposed direction on the State. The Political Opening (Abertura) initiated in the following decade—the Diastole—progressively restored pluralism and later reconstituted Brazilian democracy. The movement was necessary. Redemocratization, however, did not produce a more responsible, prepared civil elite committed to a genuinely national project.
Throughout the decades that followed redemocratization, Brazil failed to advance sufficiently in organizing its urbanization, consolidating and sophisticatedly developing its industrial base, and strengthening its still-fragile democracy. And above all, it did not keep pace, with equal rigor, with the development of technologies that today shape geopolitics and the National Power of the most prominent international actors.
Our elite operated at a different pace: remaining inert in the face of transformations that demanded preparation, continuity, and strategic vision. Democracy rebuilt rights, elections, and institutions, but it did not cure the ruling elites' inability to steer the Nation's course.
The old characteristics persisted under new parties, new coalitions, and familiar old rhetoric: patrimonialism, personalism, political patronage and pork-barrel politics, corruption, private appropriation of the State, an outlook limited to the next electoral cycle, and an inability to establish lasting national objectives.
Our elites remain selfish because they confuse their own interests with those of the national State. They remain childish because they prefer the protection of providential leaders over the weight of historical responsibility. And they remain incapable of leading because they learned how to capture shares of the State, but not how to organize it as an expression of a permanent national will.
Brazil in 2026 possesses dominant groups, but not a responsible ruling elite in the full sense. An elite cannot be defined solely by wealth, positions, prestige, or influence. It must be recognized by its ability to transform particular interests into a concept of national interest; to understand the geopolitical landscape before events force decisions; to negotiate conflicts without destroying institutions; and to prepare the State for threats that extend beyond a single government's term.
This deficiency becomes more dangerous as the international order undergoes an accelerated transformation. In the 20th century, major powers competed for territory, resources, routes, alliances, political influence, and military capability. All of this remains relevant. But contemporary competition also takes place through digital platforms, financial systems, data, technological infrastructure, industrial supply chains, artificial intelligence, sanctions, and information control.
While world powers formulate strategies for decades ahead, Brazil debates the next election. While other States identify critical capabilities, here offices and perks are handed out. While foreign governments coordinate technology, industry, defense, and foreign policy, our institutions act as compartments that frequently block and neutralize each other.
The crisis with Washington exposes this gap in capability. The United States knows the instruments of power at its disposal and shows willingness to use them: market access, tariffs, financial systems, sanctions, visas, technology, intelligence, and political influence. China also knows what it seeks in Brazil: food, energy, minerals, market access, infrastructure, diplomatic support, and a strategic position in South America.
We possess a continental territory, water, food, energy, biodiversity, minerals, population, market size, and a privileged position in the South Atlantic. These elements, however, remain mere potential as long as they are not articulated by clear objectives, planning, and decision-making capacity. Without national direction, our assets cease to be instruments of power and become objects of negotiation between third parties.
In light of this, it is not enough to ask what Brazil possesses. It is necessary to know what it can effectively leverage as bargaining power. The answer is not simply a list of natural resources. A country's true bargaining leverage depends on knowing what it intends to preserve, knowing what it can afford to yield, and possessing sufficient strength to sustain a refusal. Present-day Brazil struggles with all three conditions.
Polarization has exacerbated the problem. Government and opposition no longer clash merely over differing visions for the country. They have begun seeking backing from different external camps. The current administration aligns with forums and coalitions where China and Russia exert growing influence. Factions of the opposition seek legitimacy and support in Washington to resolve our internal problems. International policy has become an extension of domestic warfare, while national politics has turned into a gateway for foreign interests. That is not sovereignty. It is politically divided dependency.
Brazil's greatest problem does not lie in making the "right" choice between Washington, Beijing, or Moscow. It lies in regaining the capacity to formulate and sustain a strong, distinctively Brazilian position before that choice is made for us by other nations.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the elites' inability to democratically manage the existing conflicts of that era contributed heavily to the system's breakdown. Today, we are again experiencing a leadership crisis under conditions of ultrasonic speed, bewildering complexity, and rising external competition for Brazil's strategic assets. History did not return; it was us who failed to advance far enough. The current diplomatic crisis with the United States did not create this problem. It merely made it more visible.
With the end of the emergency regime, Brazilian democracy was reconstituted, and ruling elites and the Brazilian people returned to the command center. Yet in the Brazil of 2026, we still do not recognize a truly committed elite capable of overcoming the ethical and moral fragility of public life and steering the country out of its backwardness toward a minimally respectable modernity. Have we leaped from the era when Brazil was considered the country of the future to a time when it has become a country with no future?